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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1989). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
STRIKE IMPROPER AND UNSOLICITED TESTIMONY OF AN 
EXPERT WITNESS CONCERNING AN ALLEGED OFFER TO 
PURCHASE A SMALL PART OF THE REMAINING PARCEL 
AFTER CONDEMNATION. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED 
UDOT'S EXPERT TO TESTIFY ABOUT OTHER FREEWAY 
INTERCHANGE PROPERTIES WITHOUT ESTABLISHING THE 
REQUISITE FOUNDATION OF COMPARABILITY. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO CHALLENGE THE UNDERLYING 
BASIS FOR AN EXPERT WITNESS'S TESTIMONY BY 
UTILIZING HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED 
UDOT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE THAT WAS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S EARLIER RULING ON THE 
BEFORE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY. 
WHETHER THE CUMULATIVE TRIAL ERRORS WARRANT 
REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a trial court's decision on the admissibility of 
evidence and the scope of cross examination, this Court gives some 
deference to the trial court's decisions, but ultimately reviews 
those decisions under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). When the appellate court determines 
that the trial court erred in its discretion, this Court must 
reverse. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10. 
Compensation and Damages - How Assessed. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
2 
"The court, jury . . . must hear such legal evidence . . . 
and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
• • • 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff. . . " 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation case brought by the Appellee Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") to acquire by eminent domain a 
portion of the property of Appellants 6200 South Associates, Boyer 
and Gardner (the "Landowners") for the expansion of the 1-215 freeway 
interchange in Salt Lake County. All the issues involving UDOT's 
entitlement to condemn and the factors influencing the property at 
the date of condemnation were settled by stipulation or preliminary 
rulings leaving only Just Compensation to be determined by jury 
trial. 
On the sixth day of trial, the jury returned its verdict on 
damages and compensation upon which District Judge Pat B. Brian 
entered a Judgment on August 2, 1991. The Landowners thereupon filed 
their motion for additur and, alternatively, for a new trial which 
motion was denied by order dated December 30, 1991. [R. 294-297, 
403.] The Landowners filed their Notice of Appeal from the Judgment 
on January 29, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Situs and Characteristics of Property. The subject 
property consisted of 21.23 acres of unimproved land in the southeast 
3 
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2 Motion in Limine Evidentiary Hearing. Before the 
c ommencement of the tri al r m Just Compensation the trial court 
conducted >i i le.id ,• :*i \ ' '»•• ;-n i n y u p o n iiijifii'i w>t ion • < ' determined 
that; as of the date oi condemnation the existence of the l-iil'i 
1
 In a pi el utiinary motion in limine, *.*«-* *. irt found 
that UDOT had, long before 1988, committed by verified pleadings and 
statements on the public record, that 1-215 was a committed and 
approved highway facility. The real estate market plainly understood 
the existence of and property acquisition for the* freeway, a] though 
unbuilt [R ] 93-206,,] 
freeway system and attendant facilities had been established by UDOT 
for many years stretching back to 1963. [R. 195.] In fact, UDOT had 
twice previously condemned portions of the subject property for the 
initial freeway system, first in 1963 and second in 1973. In those 
condemnation actions UDOT represented in sworn testimony and trial 
maps that it had committed to establishing the freeway as designed. 
Indeed, UDOT received the advantage of special benefits as a result 
of the frontage road and 6200 South design in one or both 
condemnation actions. [R. 196.] As part of the construction of the 
freeway system, it was contemplated that not only would the subject 
property have access to the frontage road, but that 6200 South or Big 
Cottonwood Road would be relocated and widened to permit the freeway 
to function. [R. 195-96, 199.] The 6200 South interchange could not 
function if freeway traffic were poured onto old Cottonwood Road 
before it was committed to be relocated by UDOT in the 1973 
condemnation suit. 
The trial court found in favor of the landowner at the in limine 
hearing and ordered that the property be appraised in its condition 
BEFORE condemnation with the benefit of the freeway system, including 
the establishment of the frontage road and relocation of Cottonwood 
Road, as established facts, entering special Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to that effect. [R. 193.] 
3. Highest and Best Use of Total Property BEFORE Condemnation. 
With its situs on the southeast quadrant of the 1-215 freeway and 
with frontage road access, the total property prior to condemnation, 
was in the words of one of UDOT's experts, "a very good parcel of 
land, extremely well located, and a good physical development 
5 
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Rather, what caused the severance damage was UDOT's taking of all 
primary access on 6200 South and the frontage road, leaving the 
remaining property with access only from the rear by way of 3000 East 
Street. [Tr. 288-89, 471-73.] The testimony indicated that the 
condemnation taking had the effect of flipping the property on its 
head so that the most inferior, inaccessible parts of the property 
had to be used as the frontage and entrance AFTER condemnation. 
The State's evidence was that the remaining property had at 
least as reasonable if not better access AFTER condemnation than the 
total property had BEFORE condemnation and that the access to the 
subject property was actually improved as a consequence of the taking 
for the freeway interchange. [Tr. 675-78, 822.] 
5. Highest and Best Use of and Severance Damage to Remainder. 
Under the Landowners' evidence, the land planning consultants and 
appraisers could not determine a defined highest and best use for the 
remnant property AFTER condemnation. The tract was referred to as "a 
troubled property" which would be in a "transitional state." Zoning 
would be more difficult, financing would be speculative, and the 
advantage of access and orientation to the northwest in the BEFORE 
condition was a disabling handicap in the AFTER condition. [Tr. 
179.] Because access was only available from the east AFTER the 
taking, planning principles, regulations and guidelines would not 
permit the type of access that would enable reasonable business or 
residential development on the subject property. [Tr. 179.] The 
testimony of the landowners' experts concerning severance damages was 
$1,189,000.00 by J. Brown and $1,316,000.00 by J. Cook. [Tr. 300, 
484-85.] 
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a d m i s s i b l e t o d e m o n s t r a t e f a i r marke t v a l u e im l u d i n g h i g h e s t and 
H p Q f u s e » 1 * I M M I J M I li|< I i i III 11 I  I . Il II II II
 ti Hi i 1 , 1 , II III Hi I ' I i I |ll ( ii( II I I i i t » S l c ' i 
-. v\-; )rimmelen He opiiu d noi I objection, that even though 
all of the Landowners access to the pi imary frontage and Cottonwood 
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roads had been taken, the best use and developability of the 
remaining property had been enhanced and improved, if anything, as a 
result of the construction of the freeway project and accordingly, 
there was no severance damages for emasculating the access, [Tr. 
677-78.] Then in the closing moments of direct examination, UDOT 
counsel put the following inconsistent question to Van Drimmelen: 
Q. Mr. Van Drimmelen, if this property were zoned in its 
condition after the taking, the construction, as proposed 
in your opinion, would physically, the accessibility allow 
commercial development to take place? 
[Tr. 683, emphasis added.] 
After an objection as to foundation, Van Drimmelen responded, 
"yes" and UDOT counsel inquired, ,f[w]hat would your reason for that 
conclusion be?" [Tr. 684.] 
In a non-responsive answer to whether the property would be 
physically accessible AFTER the taking, the witness blurted out the 
highly inflammatory and prejudicial statement: 
A. The second reason is that in a discussion with Heber 
Jacobsen, when I was — met with him, he informed me that 
he had been negotiating with Chevron Oil to put a 
convenience store on the northeast corner of the site. And 
I believe that he — in fact, he did state — I have in my 
notes --he was negotiating at $18 a square foot. But if 
the access -- if it was not accessible off of Big 
Cottonwood Canyon Road, that the offering price was 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 to 12. I called 
Chevron Oil, to ask them if this was the case. They 
confirmed it. They did confirm the $18. 
[Tr. 685, emphasis added.] 
Landowners' counsel objected vigorously to this obviously 
inadmissible evidence and moved that the entire Van Drimmelen 
response with regard to the speculative Chevron Oil proposal be 
stricken from the record and that the jury be admonished to disregard 
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the ('indeti c I Il"  11III'"I I ifliiOT c o u n s e l acknowledged awareness tha i 
t h e wilni11! 01s youmq U> v o l u n t e e r t h e Chevron uonvtu '.nil «< ii dull 
a d m i t t e d on ly t h a t t h e men t ion o t t h e p r i c e of $18 a s q u a r e t o o t was 
impiopet Ill I 1 ml d l I hi iiii 11 11 ill In s t r i k e 4 he s pec i f i c ? 
amount of t h e o i l * " but ieluL)<Ml lu s t i ike t e s t i m o n y i e l i i l m i | I I In1 
~ f f e r . [Ti , 6 8 5 - 8 6 , ] i n an anemic e f f o r t t o c i n e t h e damage, t h e 
• III a t i « i | ••- •• ' •' •
 ; • 
COURT: "The portion of the answer that reiared lu a 
negotiated offer will be stricken from the offer. The 
rest of the answer wi J 2 remaj n." 
| "i1 h B h i fih | 
I I I ii f u r t h e r c o n f e r e n c e , o u t s i d e t h e juo y " s pi Usenet « I I 
Landowners renewed 1 he o h i a c t i o n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y and Implored t h e 
I linn I il in mi I  1 I  IN I  mi i mi I I i I I "I 1 ' i n I I  I  iK i o u r l d e c l i n e d t o d o s o 
The e v i d e n c e a t t t i c t i i J oin LRJIJI b i d e s c o n c e r n i n g iiiaikel oil ih-
t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y , b o t h BEFORE and AFTER c o n d e m n a t i o n , was i n t h e 
i diinj* nil " ' 'ill lii I HI |ii 1 illume 1 i mi i il llh i t t h e iiiiiiiiiY hiiMifJ 1 roin 
Van Drimmelen f s i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a l c u l a t e d r e s p o n s e was I I i 11 IIIOVMHI 
was w i l l im| in nf fex $18 a s q u a r e foo t wi ti) a c c e s s on B ig Cottonwood 
Rot-id and , iu , i in i m hei m \w\ i i II at oe i iln|i« lu idiii1 -> ru l inc i on I | 
s t r u c k ou ' I tin p r i c e s and l e t l b e f o r e t h e coui t I lie tA' tJuuoi^ " i ' 
p o t e n t i al o f f e r from Chevron I cm M ime amount . 
Ill.videnm u 1 __lJUiei _ _ I n t e r c h a n g e _ F i o p e r t i e s Without R e q u i s i t e 
Foundation o f Comparabi l i ty , The i n j u r i o u s e f f e c t of b l o c k IIHJ c iccess 
t o a p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n I hi . / i o i n i t y ut a f reeway i n t e r c h a n g e was 
on* 11 II i i I I ( , ! in i i T e s t i mi «n\ ' o m p a r a b l e 
p r o p e r t i e s whicl i I i. 11I si i h I 111 11 le iiid i Ii i I 11 in I 11 I I  111II i I  i at11J11 y was 
c l e a r l y a d m i s s i b l e i n Utah p i o v i d e d t h e r e was a f o u n d a t i o n l a i d a s t o 
] 0 
elements of comparability including names of buyer and seller, 
location, zoning, date and terms of the sale, etc.2 Both the 
Landowners and UDOT offered, and the lower court received in 
evidence, comparable sales of other property. [Tr. 273-84, 451-69, 
661-71, 796-801.] 
However, when dinger was called by UDOT as its closing witness, 
UDOT offered through him photographs of alleged business or 
commercial properties located near freeway interchanges in Salt Lake 
and Davis Counties. The witness was unable to tell the court, as a 
foundation to admissibility of the photographs, anything about: 
(1) The name of the owner or previous owner of the property; 
C2) Whether the property had ever sold; 
(3) The size, shape, zoning or development potential; 
(4) The access of the property, a central issue in the case; 
(5) Whether the access had been changed or blocked in a fashion 
comparable to the subject property; 
(6) Whether the photographed property was an economic unit; 
whether it had been foreclosed, was in receivership or 
bankruptcy; 
(7) The history of the property, and whether the property's use 
had been impaired, downgraded or changed as a result of 
highway condemnation. 
All that was proffered was a series of six (6) green tinted 
photographs of undefined properties situated somewhere near a freeway 
2
 Department of Transp. v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984); 
State Road Comm'n. v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 (Utah 
1961). 
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p h o t o g r a p h s b e c a u s e Lhey 1 at Red e v i d e n t i a r y t o u n d a t i o n as t o q i i i i n d h\ 
t h e g o v e r n i n g law nil t h i s S l a t e || I! mi III I - 15 , ] The Landowners ' 
iibjtH i ion wr m n v r l r n I prl nnrl InMijo Hi Irtii ini n iund llii-1 p h o t o g r a p h s of 
p r o p e r t i e s on 1 hi theory Mm I I lit1) d e m o n s t i a t e d b u s i n e s s p i o p e r t y 
development n e a r f reeway i n t e r c h a n g e s and , r e m a r k a b l y , b e c a u s e t h e 
win M n •• i I mi mi K j m II Il i I l i ' i l l l I I I I I I I I I I I II I I i M M 1 i l l f ormula t ing h i s 
opini oi i " 11 in 81!), ) Landowners counsel xnqu J J eci ml i I in i i i a i 
-judge* if the photos had been of properties in Chicago oi hos Angeles, 
II n 11 II II II M n i il in ill i in1 llli nui II inn i i m o n o i m M II i i i i II III M I II IIIIIIIIII | i 1 IM , n l f s e i ' v i i 
s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e w i t n e s s hah i t* l i ed upon llitniii, n o t i n g Uhil siinli 
s t a n d a r d v.omld a l l o w v a l u e w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y t o v i r t u a l l y 
HI ,' I Ii i mi mi ( II I mi II i II I n 1 s ( H i i i n l i i i i n IK II in i n 1 M i i llli I iil coin 1 d e n i e d t h e 
o b j e c t i o n and r e c e i v e d t h e phutoiji aiihnd p r o p e i t i e s , 11 J H I ' I , || 
I ' r e j u d i c i a l Error i n Refus ing t o Al low Landowners t o Cross 
A f t e r UDOT's e x p e r t s Van Drimmelen and C l i n g e r had bo th t e s t i f i e d 
I,, ,• iino-
 R t a k i n g of a l l IM e s s on t h e wes t and n o r t h oi thn 
prop- t"'l no I, damaged 1 ',« MM I ILI I »" , ' ' M| ' "nm »in iv\ \ T r i p o l i ,' 
AFTEH c o n d e m n a t i o n 1 IIIIINI llli w i i o r s ! c o u n s e l a t t e m p t e d i IIII c r o s s 
n i H mn n a t i o n , t o p u r s u e q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e unpin 1 amen oi t h e 
p r o p t o t y " :K;:C€,I,S,;. I'm il". * - H « . i1 . " '"in BEFORE 
and AFTER c o n d i t i o n The p r o b e noun i n I od ol I i y p o t h e t i c a i q u e s t i o n s 
in which t lie e x p e r t was a s k e d t o assume a d i f f e r e n t s e t of f a c t s I J 
t e s t L i n o i mi i I n i l I y l u l u s ,nw I ' n i m y i i i i n i m in n n i i l i l i 1 1 I \ i i in mi in in ii i i l i m s ' i 
I ml n j on„. Twice Landowners" counsel attempted cross examination bast'd 
u n a hypothetical assuinp tion as to Lhc ouLjuct property. 
Astonishingly, UDOT objected twice and the court sustained both 
objections. 
During the cross of UDOT's expert, Van Drimmelen, the following 
question was asked and objection sustained: 
Mr. Campbell (for the Landowner): 
Q: So that portion of the property in the north area, say 
above the area that is entitled 6200 South Associates 
— let's just assume for a moment, Mr. Van Drimmelen, 
the highest and best use of this property were to sell 
off the north portion of the property, before the 
taking, from the south. 
Mr. Coleman (for UDOT): 
Q: Your honor, I will object to that, assuming conditions 
of the property that didn't exist. 
Mr. Campbell: This is an expert witness. I am entitled to go into 
hypothetical questions on cross-examination. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Campbell: So that let's assume that the property had been sold 
off prior to February of 1988, the north half. This 
taking would have landlocked that property, wouldn't 
it? 
Mr. Coleman: Your honor, I object again on the basis he is assuming 
facts not in evidence. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. It does assume facts not 
in evidence. 
[Tr. 720.] 
Judge Brian took the same position when it came to UDOT's second 
expert, dinger. On cross examination, the Landowners asked the 
following hypothetical question to test the validity of the witness's 
conclusion that taking all the access on the west side of the subject 
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p r o p e r t y .
 a n ( l jQes-t u s e a n c j marke t 
value 
^mnbe'1 
J 
O W I r i i * O- lK i J r*« > • 
* Landowne r1 
ei me ask you this, u.^~ helVs jusl laku tlixs 
property, before the taking, •** will just assume that 
the property had no access from the northwest, the 900 
feet along the frontage road — let's assume that 
before the taking that wasn't there, and I t he d. no 
access at all, either, to Cottonwood Canyon Road, none 
at all. So that the property had only one access, and 
that was an orientation to the east. Right? 
"! Ml .i'1,", 
So that as you would have come off the interstate 
freeway, before the taking, you would not have had any 
way to get to this property except on 3000 East. Now, 
with that in mind, is it your — on that assumption, 
is it your opinion that his property would have been 
worth more in the market than what you found it to be 
worth before the taking? 
Your Honor, eiyaiii, Hi" i ' a .HI i m ifi'iinnc fart,1 not in 
evidence. 
The Court: i i I The Court has permitted gues t :i oris un ihril 
I The Court's position is that the witness 
I ill il mot assume facts not I n evidence, 
IMIli i'rtmphi'1 1 I think this question tests the credibility of his 
statement, 
The Sus tained. 
[Tr. iw ] 
i> st-judgment and 'rio1 —oceedings, UDOT continued to 
a - * -*hp-,-{r.=»1 * ^pt-imw imination are 
inadmiss,. .*•..*-. - * i nvlriHnre, ' 
citing two authorities, Njuhqls_y\_ Oregon Shor* . * Lu, , ll) Utah 
240 *'>*r •**'a+ * OF i Status of Rules 
Regarding Use ^i_ JLiifi- - ^uebuunb in Elici^xi*a Opii u "Oii_ of 
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Expert Witness, 56 A.L.R. 3d 300 § 6(a). It turns out that both 
citations involve only the presentation to an expert witness on 
direct examination of a hypothetical question where either record 
facts have been deleted or assumed facts have been added. Even 
though UDOT miscited the ALR authority and failed to offer a single 
precedent in which hypothetical questions on cross examination were 
precluded, the trial court sustained UDOT's objection and reaffirmed 
the ruling. [Tr. 720, 761; R. 404.] 
9. Total Value Evidence and Jury Verdict. The error of the 
trial court is clearly manifested in the jury verdict. The opinion 
testimony of the Landowners and UDOT on the market value of the land 
taken and severance damages to the remaining property are: 
Landowners' F.M.V. Severance Total 
Experts Land Taken Damages Opinion 
1. John Brown, 324,230 1,316,534 1,640,764 
A . o . A . 
2. Jonathan Cook, 294,069 1,189,127 1,483,196 
M.A.I. 
UDOT Experts 
1. David Van Drimmelen 233,746 30,8703 264,616 
M.A.I. 
2. Bryce d i n g e r , 282,800 28,8003 311,600 
M.A.I . 
After barely two hours of deliberation (with lunch included), 
the jury returned its verdict into open court as follows: 
1. Fair market value of 1.73 acres 
condemned $271,447.20 
Not severance, but alleged cost to cure internal access. 
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2. Severance damages to the remaii lii lg 20.49 
acres caused by the taking and loss of 
access ' .- • . • $ 1 44,60 7,60' 
"I, "I'IMII a I d a m a g e s •' $416,054.80 
, i 11 in i 11 1 I P V P I H i i r n ilaiiiiii'it1"1' i in in INIII I 11 I h e i a s e -
in-chief ol the Landowners was reje< I MI I by the juiy ''tea trial judge 
entered judgment mi i he jury verdict and denied new trial and other 
re 1 iot basi. d i| in i, n i ;>;i,s i I |ii IqiiiHnf H m l p '"I1") p r o c e e d i m j s . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
i'linM pie judicial error rommitted by the trial court in this case 
compel.1. ' i" evtM S"i I ' ' ' | iiJijiPiepi I>MI h I * MW I I <* I 
c o m p e n s a t i o n I s s u e s , 
The e v i d e n c e of t h e w i t n e s s Vf»n Orimmelen mi II M s o - c a l l e d 
C h e v r o n Mi I inl 1 M i WHS I I HI I  I i,iiiiinN,H,or y iiiinill IMIIIHJ I IIIMM O<I I 11 || i I 111 I I I  11 
i n d e l i b l e p e r c e p t i o n w i t h t h e j u r y ' i M t UDOT s t d iking oi d > j oi tm 
b u s i n e s s and p r i m a r y a c c e s s t o t h e p r o p e r t y was of no c o n s e q u e n t «> 
t h a t t h e r n m m r i n ' | p r o p c ' y ,i|-*t- u " " ' 1 1 m^ny ' HHPL IDMM ""» ii«i .SC-'I/PI fjtl 
c o n d i t i o n AFTER c o n d e m n a t i o n t h a n i l was w o r t h BEFORE c o n d e m n a t i o n . 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r n f u f n 1 *n s t r i k e n i l t e s t i m o n y r e l a t i n g t o t>p 
o f f e r a n d t o in linn iiiiii in In I hi (m mi in | I 11 .MI e q a i i I ill mi i lt"i 111 m i . MI n o r . 
T h i s i s s u e a l o n e , w a r r a n t s r e v e r s a l a n d new t r i a l ; e l s e v > . u p n i 
in Il mi t' s w i t n e s s w i l l tie r e w a r d e d fox h a v i n g i n t e n t i o n a l l y I I I L I L J need 
know.! ny J y i ihirlm i S5 IIMI-1 PV P LIOH v, • • ^ - . . 
For the trial court to permit UDOT to demonstrate and argue 
before the jury O U M M interchipJIIJC? properties without any foundation 
a s t o c o m p a x aL> i J i 1 y < •< Mist, i I u I e t l i e v e e s i b ] e e i : i o r 1 1 ifi HI II I IIIIII I < »i in Jil I I | 
is that the jury waiEi f rice fed tht* prejudicial misperception 1 h.-il 
properties
 contiguous to an interchange are somehow inevitably 
benefitted and suitable for commercial development despite the 
crippling effects of access exappropriated by UDOT. The admission of 
the photographs of other properties without foundation of 
comparability was unprecedented in an eminent domain trial in Utah 
and is reversible error. 
The trial court erred prejudicially in cutting off cross 
examination based on hypothetical questions of both UDOT experts to 
test the validity of their testimony that access to the freeway 
system BEFORE condemnation was not central to the property's highest 
and best use and value. The case law and authorities in Utah plainly 
permit and encourage penetrating cross examination. Moreover, the 
trial court committed error when it permitted UDOT to undermine the 
ruling on the evidentiary in limine issue of the existence of the I-
215 freeway system as part of the valuation analysis of the total 
property as of the date of taking. UDOT's experts violated the law 
of the case in treating the freeway as though it were functionally 
inoperable because of the lack of feeder roads. It was reversible 
error to permit UDOT's evidence. 
Although each of these errors is reversible error in its own 
right, collectively the weight of prejudice is suffocating. It 
poisoned the proceeding depriving the landowners of the fundamental 
right to a fair trial. Under the cumulative error analysis adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court a new trial is mandated. 
17 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO STRIKE ALL UDOT EXPERT TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE INADMISSIBLE CHEVRON OFFER TO 
PURCHASE A PART OF THE REMAINING PROPERTY. 
The illicit, gratuitously volunteered testimony of Van Drimmelen 
regarding the alleged Chevron Oil offer as to part of the remaining 
property came at a highly critical point in the trial and in the 
closing minutes of Van Drimmelenfs testimony-in-chief. The testimony 
prior to Van Drimmelen had clearly shown that the condemnation taking 
and particularly the elimination of all access from the two primary 
roadways serving the property had required the remaining property to 
rely on back-door access and had effectively flipped the property 
upside-down. The resulting severance damages to the remaining 
property were concluded by preeminent land planners to be severe, 
with two expert witnesses having quantified the severance injury at 
$1,316,000.00, and $1,189,000.00, respectively. 
Thus, the seminal question in the trial was on the line when Van 
Drimmelen took the stand. Van Drimmelen testified that not only was 
there no severance damages, whatsoever, to the remaining property 
caused by the taking and the loss of all the primary business and 
residential access, but that the remaining property was more valuable 
and better off AFTER the loss of access than BEFORE. His direct 
examination was all but ended when UDOT counsel asked him, assuming 
the property were commercially zoned after the taking, whether there 
was adequate access "physically" to allow commercial development. 
[Tr. 683.] Suddenly and without warning, Van Drimmelen blurted out 
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information regarding an alleged Chevron Oil offer to purchase a 
corner of the remaining property for a price of $18.00 s/f with 
access on Big Cottonwood Road and $10-$12 s/f with no access on such 
road. Those figures, erupting into the courtroom, were between 250% 
and 450% higher than anyone had appraised the Landowners1 property, 
even BEFORE the condemnation taking. It was highly inflammatory and 
shocking testimony, made all the more prejudicial by the fact that 
Landowners' counsel was required to object to the testimony and move 
to strike. It was further emphasized by the fact that the trial 
judge, while striking the dollar amount of the alleged Chevron offer, 
permitted the balance of Van Drimmelen's testimony to stand. 
i. Offers and Negotiations as to Potential Future Purchases 
Are Flatly Inadmissible. In determining fair market value, including 
severance damages, in eminent domain, the law has been settled in 
this Country since the turn of the century that offers to purchase, 
or negotiations as to potential future transactions, are 
inadmissible. The United States Supreme Court established the rule 
in Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903): 
[Offers for purchase] at most [are] a species of 
indirect evidence of the opinion of the person making 
such offer as to the value of the land. He may also 
have so slight a knowledge on the subject as to render 
his opinion of no value, and inadmissible for that 
reason. He may have wanted the land for some 
particular purpose disconnected from its value. Pure 
speculation may hcive induced it, a willingness to take 
chances that some new use of the land, might in the 
end, prove profitable. There is no opportunity to 
cross examine the person making the offer, to show the 
various facts. Again, it is of a nature entirely too 
uncertain, shadowy and speculative to form any solid 
foundation for determining the value of the land which 
is sought to be taken in condemnation proceedings. 
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Id. at 115 (emphasis added). See also Continental Pipe Line Co. v. 
Irwin Livestock Co., 625 P.2d 214, 217 n.5 (Wyo. 1981); City of 
Wichita v. Jennings, 199 Kan. 621, 433 P.2d 351 (1967); Ruth v. 
Department of Highways, 145 Colo. 546, 359 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1961) (en 
banc). 
The rationale for excluding offers or negotiations is that they 
are easily fabricated, are used as negotiating ploys, and do not 
satisfy the most fundamental test of fair market value — what the 
willing buyer actually paid to the willing seller. State Road 
Comm'n. v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963); McAlester 
Urban Renewal Authority v. Watts, 516 P.2d 261, 263 (Okla. 1973). 
i . Van Drimmelen Knew That the Alleged Chevron Offer was 
Inadmissible. By virtue of the comments of UDOT counsel, there was 
reason for the court to believe that the question was a "plantH and 
that there was advance knowledge that testimony on the alleged 
Chevron offer was coming.4 What is important is that Van Drimmelen 
knew that the Chevron testimony was inadmissible and intentionally 
introduced it notwithstanding that knowledge. The witness is a 
Indeed, Mr. Coleman's statement to the court indicates that 
he was aware that the offer to purchase would be gratuitously 
volunteered in Van Drimmelenfs testimony. 
That [meaning the amount of the offer] shouldn't 
have come in . . . [t]he purpose of the testimony was 
to indicate that in the after condition, if there was 
a demand for commercial property in the before, it was 
still there in the after . . . [t]he reason for 
bringing the testimony out with this witness with 
regard to inquires respecting commercial development 
in the after, it was to show that if this property 
could have been used for commercial purposes in the 
before condition, it could have been used for 
commercial purposes in the after. 
[Tr. 697-98, emphasis added.] 
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member of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, carrying 
the "MAI" designation. The MAI organization has published a book 
acknowledged by Van Drimmelen, entitled Condemnation Appraisal 
Practice, Donnelley & Sons Co., Chicago, Illinois (1967), which 
contains the following direction to MAI appraisers: 
H
. . . If evidence of the price of similar land is to 
be admitted, the rule is firmly established that it must be 
confined to the amount actually paid in a completed 
transaction. Mere offers, whether made by the owner of 
such land or to him, are inadmissible.M 
Id. at 48 (emphasis added). Van Drimmelen was portrayed by UDOT as 
an experienced testifying expert. He was all that. 
Van Drimmelen succeeded in injecting into the proceeding 
evidence that was incompetent and inadmissible. 
3. Failure to Strike All of Van Drimmelenfs Chevron Testimony 
was Prejudicial and Reversible Error. The court's denial of the 
Landowners' motion to strike all of Van Drimmelenfs testimony 
regarding the Chevron offer denied 6200 South Associates a fair 
trial. By rejecting the Landowners' argument and striking only the 
alleged offering prices, the court let stand before the jury the 
prejudicial allegation that Chevron was prepared to buy a portion of 
the remaining property with or without access. Only because of some 
technical objection which remained unexplained to the jurors, the 
jury was not entitled to know the price (although due to Van 
Drimmelen's tactics they did indeed know the price). The stained 
Chevron testimony undercut the Landowners' evidence that the highest 
and best use AFTER condemnation was not for business purpose, but 
rather, speculative. 
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Landowners? counsel could not pursue the Chevron testimony which 
the trial court left hanging, for fear it would only further cement 
the whole concept in the minds of the jurors. Consequently, the 
inflammatory episode left the jury with the indelible implication 
that the Chevron offer (although absolutely inadmissible under the 
law of this State), demonstrated extreme commercial interest in the 
property by one of the largest, most sophisticated companies in the 
world. 
UDOT is not entitled to obtain the fruits of admittedly 
inadmissible evidence. If the alleged offering price was 
inadmissible, then the fact of the offer, and related evidence was 
equally inadmissible. Accordingly, it was prejudicial error for the 
trial court not to strike all evidence relative to Chevron's alleged 
offer and not to have instructed the jury to disregard the evidence. 
Mooref s Federal Practice, \\ 61.07 [1] (1992) ("when . . . an 
evidentiary ruling does violate a party's substantial rights, the 
error is prejudicial and reversal is warranted"); Joseph v. W.H. 
Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330, 333 
(1957) (emphasis added) ("If [the error] appears to be of sufficient 
moment that there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of 
such error a different result should have been eventuated, the error 
should be regarded as prejudicial and relief should be granted"); 
Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (admission of 
prejudicial evidence was not harmless and warrants a new trial). 
A new trial is required to correct the manifest injustice that 
occurred in the Van Drimmelen testimony. 
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POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
ADMITTING PHOTOGRAPHS AND TESTIMONY OF OTHER 
FREEWAY INTERCHANGE PROPERTIES WITHOUT 
FOUNDATION. 
A fundamental principle of eminent domain law is that evidence 
of other properties is not admissible absent adequate foundation of 
comparability. The lower court violated that principle, committing 
reversible error by admitting prejudicial photographs and testimony 
of other properties without the requisite demonstration of 
comparability. 
UDOT offered through one of its appraisers photographs of six 
developed commercial properties located near freeway interchanges 
along the Wasatch Front; but without any foundation whatsoever. No 
foundation was presented concerning the ownership, sale, size, shape 
or financing of the photographed properties. Foundation was not laid 
concerning the economic vitality or viability of the properties 
photographed; whether they were successful or in foreclosure, 
receivership or bankruptcy; or whether they had been impaired or 
down-graded as a result of highway condemnation. No foundation was 
established on issues as fundamental as access or highest and best 
use. 
Despite this foundational vacuum, and over the strenuous 
objections of the landowners, the prejudicial photographs and 
testimony were welcomed into evidence by the court and took center 
stage in the proceeding. 
1. Evidence of Other Properties Without the Requisite 
Foundation is Inadmissible. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
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declared that in condemnation cases evidence of facts relating to 
other properties is flatly inadmissible without the requisite 
foundation showing comparability.5 The test of comparability is 
defined in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Inv., 
Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974): 
Real estate has always been regarded as unique 
because no two parcels can be exactly alike. It is 
certainly not to be supposed there will be found sales 
which are identical as to time, location, quantity and 
various characteristics of the property. The 
requirement is that it meet the test of "reasonable 
comparability." That is, that these factors exist in 
sufficient similarity that the sale can fairly be 
regarded as having some probative value at arriving at 
a proper appraisal of the property. 
Id. at 1373. 
Unless a foundational demonstration of sufficient similarity 
can be made, the test of reasonable comparability cannot be met, and 
the evidence is inadmissible. 
In State v. Larkin, 25 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972), a case 
involving the condemnation of property in Box Elder County, the 
plaintiff attempted, on both direct examination and cross examination 
to introduce evidence of sales of properties located near freeway 
interchanges in the Brigham City and Tremonton areas. The court 
sustained the defendant's objection excluding evidence of those other 
properties because they were too remote both as to distance and type 
of area. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rejection 
of the evidence noting that a "survey of the record reveals that the 
Redevelopment of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 
P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974), State Road Comm'n. v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 
495 P.2d 817 (1972), State Road Comm'n. v. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 
390 P.2d 860 (1964), State Road Comm'n. v. E. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 
317, 366 P.2d 76 (1961). 
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dissimilarities indicated in the properties were sufficient to 
preclude a ruling by this Court that the trial court abused its 
discretion in rejecting the improper testimony." Id. at 820. 
The error of admitting photographs of other properties without 
foundation is underscored by this Court's recent ruling in Carpet 
Barn v. State by and through Dep't. Of Transp., 786 P.2d 770 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). In that case the landowner, through his expert 
appraisal witness, attempted to introduce into evidence photographs 
and testimony concerning the access allowed to other properties near 
the Carpet Barn. Ironically, UDOT strongly objected to the introduc-
tion of that evidence arguing that it was inadmissible absent a 
foundational showing of substantial similarity between each of the 
properties and the subject property. The trial court excluded the 
evidence and the landowner appealed. This Court affirmed the trial 
court adopting the argument of UDOT (which is directly contrary to 
its position in this case) holding that the evidence was inadmissible 
because a demonstration of similarity between the properties had not 
been made. 
We agree with the State [UDOT] that the issue of 
reasonable access as it affects a determination of 
severance damages is dependant on the particular facts 
and circumstances of each case. [Citations omitted.] 
Because appellants failed to demonstrate complete 
similarity between the other properties and their own 
circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to allow evidence of access afforded other 
properties, especially since such evidence would have 
little bearing on the question of diminished value of 
this property as a result of the severance. 
Id. at 774. The Carpet Barn analysis skewers UDOT's inconsistent 
argument in this case. 
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2. Reliance By An Expert Does Not Render Inadmissible Evidence 
Admissible. In this case the lower court admitted the tainted 
evidence stating, almost talismanically, that it was proper because 
the testifying expert relied upon it. But the court's ruling is 
wrong; devoid of support in the rules of evidence or the interpreting 
case law. 
Expert testimony, like the testimony of all other witnesses, 
must have a proper foundation to be admissible. Inadmissible, 
prejudicial testimony is not laundered admissible simply because an 
expert says he relied upon it. Otherwise the exception swallows the 
rule and an expert would be a conduit for any evidence otherwise 
inadmissible, regardless of how inflammatory, irrelevant, or 
prejudicial. 
The lower court's error stems from a misapprehension of Rule 703 
of the Rules of Evidence. That rule provides that an expert's 
opinion may not be excluded merely because it is based on facts or 
data that are inadmissible evidence. But "while an expert may base 
an opinion on such evidence, it does not magically render the 
[inadmissible] evidence admissible." Rose Hall Ltd. v. Chase 
Manhattan Overseas Banking, 576 F. Supp. 107, 158 (D. Del. 1983) 
(emphasis added). Testimony that is inadmissible because it is 
prejudicial, misleading, irrelevant or otherwise improper remains 
inadmissible, even though an expert relied upon it. Barrel of Fun, 
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1984). 
In Barrel of Fun, the trial court permitted an expert to testify to 
evidence not otherwise admissible because it was relied upon by the 
expert in forming his opinion. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
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reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial with 
the instruction that the court exclude the offending testimony. The 
Court explained: 
In admitting Roth's testimony the district court 
relied on Fed.R.Evid. 703. We believe the court 
misapprehended the scope and effect of that Rule. It 
correctly noted that under Rule 703, expert testimony 
may not be excluded merely because it is based on 
facts or data that are inadmissible in evidence. 
However, the Rule does not guarantee the admissibility 
of all expert testimony that meets its criteria if 
such testimony runs afoul other evidentiary 
requirements. For instance, expert testimony 
otherwise admissible under Rules 702 and 703 may still 
be excluded "if its probative value substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury . . . • " 
Fed.R.Evid. 403. Because we hold today that PSE 
evidence, whether in the form of raw data or expert 
opinion interpreting or extrapolating upon that data 
is inherently suspect, Rule 703 cannot, standing 
alone, provide an avenue for its admission. 
Id. at 1033, (emphasis added).6 
3. The Evidence was Patently Prejudicial. In the instant 
case, the actions of UDOT were highly prejudicial. UDOT surrounded 
the jury with scores of photographs from other interchanges along the 
interstate highway depicting commercial development of abutting 
properties; but without any foundation demonstrating the requisite 
6
 See also Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722 (2nd Cir. 
1991) (trial court committed reversible error by permitting an expert 
witness to testify to matters otherwise inadmissible even though he 
relied on the information in forming his opinion); Christophersen v. 
Allied-Signa Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.), cert, denied U.S. 
, 112 S.Ct. 1280, 117 L.Ed.2d 606 (1992) (expert testimony is 
inadmissible if its probative value is outweighed by danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury); United 
States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979) (expert testimony is 
subject to exclusion under Rule 403 if probative value is outweighed 
by risk of unfair prejudice); United States v, Katz, 213 F.2d 799 
(1st Cir.), cert, denied 348 U.S. 857 (1954) (an expert witness may 
rely upon inadmissible hearsay testimony as a ground for his opinion, 
but that does not render the hearsay testimony admissible). 
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similarity between the properties pictured and the subject property. 
Without that foundation it is impossible to determine whether the 
purported developments depicted in the photographs were relevant. 
Without that foundation, it is impossible to know whether the 
development of the properties photographed represents the highest and 
best use thereof or an over improvement resulting in economic 
obsolescence; or whether the development has been validated by market 
acceptance and success or invalidated by bankruptcy, foreclosure or 
receivership. Without that foundation it is impossible to discern 
whether the photographed properties have the same access impairment 
and limitations as the subject property in the AFTER condition. 
Nevertheless, the evidence came in and the properties were 
paraded past the jury in photographic detail. Because every 
photographed property located at an interstate interchange was in 
some stage of business development, the subject property could be 
commercially developed. That was the message broadcast to the jury 
in living color, six times. That was the clear, unavoidable 
implication of those photographs, reinforced and underscored six 
times by the court's denial of the objections to admissibility. 
Permitting the jury to view and consider the irrelevant, 
misleading properties depicting commercial development severely 
prejudiced the landowners in this case. It is plain error and 
mandates reversal and a new trial. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
FORECLOSING APPELLANTST CROSS EXAMINATION OF 
UDOT'S EXPERT WITNESSES BASED UPON HYPOTHETICAL 
QUESTIONS. 
1. The Evidence Preclusion Affected Both of UDOT's Experts. 
On cross examination, Landowners' counsel attempted to inquire 
of Van Drimmelen and dinger the value they had placed on the 
property BEFORE condemnation stemming from the abundant access the 
property enjoyed to 1-215, the frontage road, and Big Cottonwood Road 
(all of which were lost by the UDOT taking). To punctuate the 
importance of the access from the west and north BEFORE condemnation 
and its impact on value, the Landowners put a hypothetical question 
to Clinger on cross examination, asking him to assume that there had 
been no access to the subject property BEFORE condemnation from the 
west and the north — what effect would that have had upon the BEFORE 
value. (See Statement of Facts at p. 3 herein.) The question was 
clearly designed to test the witness's credibility and the validity 
of his opinion as to the critical issue of access. Remarkably, UDOT 
objected, claiming that Clinger was being asked Mto assume facts not 
in evidence," an objection which is fundamentally improper on cross 
examination of an expert. State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 
630, 637-38 (Utah 1953). Without even discussing the prevailing law, 
Judge Brian sustained UDOT's objection noting that it is "the Court's 
position is that the witness should not assume facts not in 
evidence." [Tr. 760-61.] 
The same drama was played out in the Landowners' cross 
examination of Van Drimmelen. Twice with regard to two successive 
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questions, UDOT objected to the Landowners' questions because they 
"assumed facts not in evidence." Twice, the Landowners acknowledged 
that was the precise purpose for the question: to test the validity 
of the expert's premise on the importance of access to the property, 
both BEFORE and AFTER the taking by stretching the premise to its 
logical extreme. Twice, the trial judge cut off this keystone 
examination on the sole ground that the hypothetical facts were 
assumed. [Tr. 720.] 
2. Overwhelming Case Law Permits, Indeed, Encourages 
Hypothetical Questions on Cross Examination of an Expert. The 
principle has been so well settled in American trial procedure that 
cross examination of an expert witness on assumed facts relevant to 
the case is permitted and encouraged, that authoritative precedent is 
barely necessary. The Supreme Court of Utah acknowledged the 
principle nearly 40 years ago in the condemnation case of State v. 
Peek, 265 P.2d 630, 637 (Utah 1953) in which the court stated: 
"A witness who is given an opinion of value may . . . in 
the discretion of the court, be asked questions on cross 
examination, for the purpose of testing his opinion, which 
would be improper upon direct examination. He may, for 
example, be asked if certain assumed facts would modify his 
j udgment . . . ." 
Id. at 637. 
Noting that great latitude in the cross examination of experts 
is permitted so long as it is reasonably connected up to the case, 
the Oregon Supreme Court held in Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 277 Or. 239, 
560 P.2d 636 (1977) that it was prejudicial error to bar the cross 
examiner from "exposing the weakness" of the defendant's expert 
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opinion by demonstrating that a change in the underlying facts would 
require a modification of the expert's opinion: 
We hold this was a proper hypothetical question on 
cross examination. By sustaining defendant's improper 
objection to that question, plaintiff was improperly 
limited in the discharge of the 'formidable' task imposed 
upon the cross examiner . . . to expose, if he could, the 
weakness of the testimony given by an expert witness in 
response to a question on direct examination . . . by 
showing that 'a change in the facts' assumed by the expert 
to be true would necessitate a change in that opinion. 
[Citing Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., Inc., 498 P.2d 766 (Or. 
1972).] 
Id. at 636. 
It is no doubt true that on direct examination, an expert 
witness, in formulating his express opinion, must rely upon facts 
that are established in the record and, generally, cannot predicate 
a conclusion upon unproven or speculative factors. State Road 
Comm'n. v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 (Utah 1961). Panter 
v. Marshall Fields Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert, denied 454 
U.S. 1092 (1981); Davenport v. Taylor Feed Mill, 784 S.W.2d 923 
(Tenn. 1990); Roberts v. C & M Ready Mix Concrete Co., 767 P.2d 769, 
771 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
But when it comes to cross examination, the cross examiner is 
not confined to the theory, bases, or details of the expert on direct 
examination. He may pursue hypothetical questions to test the 
expert's conclusions in all aspects: 
The witness may be asked to answer questions which 
present hypothetically the facts claimed to constitute the 
case or defense of the cross-examining party; . . . 
Moreover, although on direct examination the 
hypothetical questions must be based upon facts which the 
evidence tends to prove, no such limit is ordinarily 
imposed upon cross examination; for the purpose of testing 
the accuracy or credibility of the expert, or the value of 
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his opinions, he may be interrogated as to pertinent 
hypothetical cases concerning which no evidence has been 
given. 
Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal, § 14.29, p. 665-66 (6th Ed. 
with supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
On new trial argument, UDOT claimed that an annotation in 56 
A.L.R. 3d 300 § 6(a) (1974) supported its view that hypothetical 
questions of an expert witness were improper and objectionable.7 It 
turns out, however, that UDOT's citation to the A.L.R. annotation 
related to direct examination and not to cross examination of the 
opponent's expert. As to the latter, the succeeding paragraph 6(b) 
of 56 A.L.R. 3d 300 states: 
Thus, although some courts have concluded that the 
rule that a hypothetical question must assume only facts in 
evidence applies regardless of the nature of the 
examination being conducted, it has been acknowledged in 
other decisions that a hypothetical question which assumes 
matters which are not supported by the evidence may 
properly be asked during the cross examination of an 
opponent's expert witness for the purpose of testing his 
knowledge or competency. (Emphasis added.) 
56 A.L.R. 3d at 323. 
It was, thus, clear error for Judge Brian to shut out the light 
from cross examination of UDOT's expert witnesses that would have 
reflected from the hypothetical questions on access to various parts 
of the property prior to condemnation. It would have been the 
crucible to test Van Drimmelen's and dinger's conclusions that the 
condemnation of all of the primary access of the Landowners' property 
The statement in section 6(a) sets out that "[A]s a general 
rule, the courts uniformly recognize that the factual assumptions 
made in a hypothetical question propounded to an expert witness must 
. . . include only such matters as are supported by the evidence 
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by UDOT did not injure or depreciate by one dollar the value or best 
use of the remaining property. 
3. The Error of the Trial Court was Prejudicial and 
Reversible, Requiring a New Trial. The result of the court's 
exclusion of the hypothetical questions on cross examination of Van 
Drimmelen and dinger was serious and fundamental. The backbone of 
6200 South's case was not that the taking of the 1.23 acres had 
caused irreparable severance damage to the remaining land; the 
Landowners could have turned that property over to the State without 
severance injury had the taking not included all of the property's 
access rights on the two primary sides, the west and north. It was 
the expropriation of all ingress and egress to the north and west 
which was the seminal issue in the case. What the excluded cross 
examination of Van Drimmelen and dinger was designed to develop was 
whether, in arriving at the property's market value BEFORE 
condemnation, they had placed importance upon the access from the 
north and west. If they had given it high importance (which it 
appears likely), then the loss of those entire rights of access, 
ingress and egress, should have, contrary to their testimony, 
resulted in a significant devaluation of the remaining property. If 
Van Drimmelen and dinger had not placed emphasis on access from the 
north and west from the total property BEFORE condemnation, then the 
question would have been presented: How were they able to use 
comparable sales in establishing the BEFORE value which had direct 
access to a freeway interchange or frontage road? Thus, the 
witnesses were facing a "catch-22M which, in all events, would have 
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been most damaging to the their credibility and the validity of their 
opinions. 
With the trial court's ruling, the jury was robbed of the 
evidence which would have permitted it to weigh the significance of 
UDOT's expert testimony on the central issue of the trial. Under 
such circumstances, the erroneous exclusion was prejudicial and 
reversible error requiring a new trial. State Road Comm'n. v. 
Johnson, 550 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). The gap in the cross examination 
did not just infect a portion of UDOT's case on market value, it 
infected all of UDOT's value evidence. The Landowners' rights which 
were injured were not only substantial, under Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P. 2d 920 (Utah 1990), the injury was 
prejudicial under the controlling precedent. See also Joseph v. W.H. 
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 318 P.2d 330 (Utah 1957); Utah 
Rule of Evidence 103. 
A new trial on the issue of severance damages and Just 
Compensation is required under the exigent error of the trial court. 
POINT IV. 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN PERMITTING UDOT TO SUBVERT THE EARLIER 
ILLUMINING EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WHICH HAD BECOME 
THE LAW OF THE CASE AT TRIAL. 
Once a court makes a ruling on the admissibility of trial 
evidence, that ruling is binding during the duration of the trial. 
This law of the case doctrine avoids delay, prevents repetitive 
arguments being made, and allows the parties to proceed in the 
presentation of evidence under defined law. Richardson v. Grand 
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Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake City Corp. v» 
James Const., 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In the evidentiary hearing on UDOT's motion in limine, the trial 
court plainly determined that in valuing the Landowners' property 
before condemnation, the property was to be appraised with the 
knowledge that the 1-215 freeway interchange, and attendant frontage 
and feeder roads would benefit the subject property. This was 
because UDOT's well established, long standing plans and commitment 
to construct the freeway project had become a market reality 
reflected in the value of the property. Included within that project 
was the diamond interchange, frontage road contiguous to the subject 
property, and the necessary relocation and widening of Big Cottonwood 
Road (6200 South) extended to the west and east to allow the freeway 
interchange to fully operate. The in limine ruling of the trial 
court was reduced to formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. 
[R. 193-206.] 
At the valuation trial UDOT, and its witnesses, subverted and 
violated what plainly had become the law of the case. It offered 
evidence that the property in the BEFORE condition did not benefit 
from the freeway interchange because the interchange would have 
dumped traffic onto a narrow, inadequate county road, the old 
Cottonwood Road. Even to the untrained eye the interchange could not 
reasonably function with such a palpably unsuitable feeder road. The 
anatomy of any freeway interchange includes and requires a feeder 
road sufficient to accomodate the freeway generated traffic. Indeed, 
UDOT's plans long before 1988, had reflected feeder and corollary 
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roads that would have made the 6200 South interchange viable and 
operable. The court's in limine ruling recognized that fact. 
What the UDOT expert witnesses did by testifying that there 
would not be an adequate road network to feed and receive traffic 
from the 1-215 interchange was to make that interchange, before 
condemnation, a farce. In doing so, UDOT, with the trial court's 
erroneous permission, was able to subvert and undo the court's in 
limine ruling. Such constitutes reversible error. Menin v. County 
Court, 697 P.2d 398, 399 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming trial court 
contempt order for violation of prior motion in limine order); 
Commonwealth of Penn. v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating 
Engineers, 73 F.R.D. 551, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding lawyer in 
contempt for failure to adhere to trial court's earlier evidentiary 
determination). 
POINT V. 
THE WEIGHT OF THE CUMULATIVE ERROR IS PATENTLY 
PREJUDICIAL, MANDATING A NEW TRIAL. 
Each of the errors discussed in the proceeding points is, by 
itself, sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. But the 
prejudice caused by the errors is compounded exponentially when 
viewed cumulatively and in the context of the entire trial. Indeed, 
the collective weight of prejudice is suffocating. In response to 
the cumulative impact of trial errors, Utah appellate courts have 
adopted a "cumulative" error basis for granting new trials. Under 
the cumulative error analysis a new trial is warranted when multiple 
errors are made at trial, even though no single error, standing alone 
would require reversal. 
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In Ivie v. Richardson, 336 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1959), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where errors are committed by the trial 
court, which "may not by themselves justify a reversal, [they] may 
well, when considered together with others, render it clear that a 
fair trial was not had." Id. at 787. In Ivie, the court found that 
the cumulative effect of the trial court? s errors in instructing the 
jury and the admission of evidence of the defendant's insurance 
coverage was prejudicial and required a new trial. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court used the cumulative error analysis in reversing the 
lower court and granting a new trial in Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990), where, as in this case, 
the trial court's errors consisted of erroneous limitation of cross 
examination and erroneous exclusion of evidence. See also Dawson v. 
Olson, 543 P.2d 499, 508 (Idaho 1975) (following Ivie v. Richardson 
and requiring a new trial based on cumulative error). 
The cumulative effect of the trial court's refusal to strike 
unsolicited, improper testimony concerning the Chevron offer, its 
allowance of testimony of other properties without any foundation of 
comparability, and its refusal to allow Landowner's counsel to 
challenge the basis for the experts' opinions through the use of 
hypothetical questions had a devastating impact on the proceeding, 
robbing the Landowners of a fair, impartial trial. 
While there is sufficient basis to reverse the lower court for 
any one of the errors described above, at a minimum, the Landowner is 
entitled to a new trial due to the cumulative prejudicial effect of 
the multiple errors. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above the lower court committed 
prejudicial error. Consequently, this court should reverse the lower 
court and remand the proceedings for a new trial. 
DATED this 8th day of September, 1992. 
Attorneys for Appellants 6200 South 
Associates, H. Roger Boyer and Kern C. 
Gardner 
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